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iNtRODuCtiON
The funded private pension pillar was established in 1998 in 
Hungary. In 2011 members were offered the option to 
return to the pay-as-you-go pillar of the state. The 
conditions for the choice were defined in such a way that 
only 3 per cent of private pension fund members decided to 
stay; thus the entire private pension fund pillar was 
essentially abolished.
Similarly, in 1998 contribution payers were given the choice 
of remaining in the state pillar or switching to the mixed 
funding system, i.e. they were allowed to become private 
pension fund members by relinquishing one-fourth of their 
future state pension. Switching, however, was mandatory for 
new entrants to the labour market. A portion of contributions 
collected previously by the state was rechanneled, 
constituting the revenues of private pension funds. Had this 
been carried out over a transitional phase of several 
decades, it would have certainly deteriorated the general 
government balance, as the contributions transferred and 
the interest burden on the resultant debt accumulation 
would have increased the deficit, while the savings on 
pension expenditures would only have materialised very 
slowly. While this deterioration would have turned into 
improvement in the deficit once the system “had matured”, 
it is hard to estimate the long-term net effect. In this 
respect, estimates made at different times yielded different 
results (Benczúr, 1999; Orbán and Palotai, 2005). Indeed, 
whether the contribution payer or the government benefited 
from the mixed system largely depended on how large the 
contribution lost by the state would have been, versus the 
size of the future pension amount the state would have been 
exempted from in return. The lost contribution was 6 per 
cent instead of 8 per cent for several years, and the pension 
commitment of the government also changed over time 
(increased by the 13th month pension and decreased by its 
reversal, and affected by changes in the retirement age and 
the replacement ratio). This study is not intended to 
determine what the long-term impact of the mixed system 
would have been; i.e. it does not address the impact of the 
return to the pay-as-you-go pillar. 
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The private pension pillar established in 1998 has generated equally important short-, medium- and long-term effects. This 
article addresses the short- and medium-term time horizons, which differ from one another. In the short term, the 
government lost contribution revenues, while its pension expenditures did not decrease. However, since this shortfall in 
state revenues did not influence the consumption and savings decisions of households, in this analysis the short-term 
indicators of fiscal impact on demand disregard the impact of lost revenues. In the medium term, however, the 
rechanneling of contributions increased public debt and household savings. Consequently, similarly to official statistics, 
our household indicators and our medium-term fiscal indicator (augmented SNA deficit) take into account the effect of lost 
revenues. As the vast majority of members returned to the state pension pillar in 2011, for the purposes of our analysis, 
we could well assume that the private pension pillar never existed. Accordingly, the difference between our medium-term 
fiscal indicator and the short-term indicator disappears. As a result, we have changed our household indicators retroactively 
in such a way as if the contributions and the returns they yielded had always belonged to the state. This was necessary 
because the official statistics do not spread this amount over time, but account for it in full for 2011 as a capital transfer 
between households and the general government, which renders evaluation of the developments extremely difficult.
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1   For the purposes of this article, the 1998 pension reform merely refers to the establishment of the funded second pillar; the impact of simultaneous 
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The rest of the article focuses on short- and medium-term 
aspects. Firstly, we examine the statistical implications of 
the abolition of the mixed pension system. Next we discuss 
the adjustments we made to the household and general 
government indicators presented in the MNB’s Report on 
Inflation for analysis purposes.2
SHORt- AND MeDiuM-teRM eFFeCtS
First we present the short- and medium-term effects 
related to pension funds. Over the medium term, the 
pension reform deteriorates both the public debt figure 
and the ESA-based general government deficit through 
the rechanneling of contributions. Indeed, from the point 
of view of statistical accounting, the redistribution 
system of the government only includes the state pillar, 
i.e. where expenditures are paid from actual revenues. In 
any case, the category of financial wealth could not have 
considered the decline in the implicit liabilities deriving 
from pension commitments as a factor offsetting the 
increase in public debt, because estimating its stock is 
extremely uncertain (Benczúr, 1999; Orbán and Palotai, 
2005). Similarly, the wealth accumulated in pension funds 
is recorded as household savings; however, the net 
present value of the state pension commitment under the 
pay-as-you-go pillar may not be recorded as a receivable. 
Accordingly, the returns on the rechanneled contributions 
and savings can be considered as household income; in 
other words, the net financing capacity of households 
has improved.
On the other hand, the short-term effect is significantly 
different, given that each contribution payment has an 
effect on households and corporates. This also entails that 
even though the contributions paid under the fully funded 
private pension pillar disappear from general government 
revenues from a statistical perspective, their short-term 
effect on taxpayers remains similar to those exerted by 
taxes. As such, the contributions lost by the state to the 
benefit of the second pillar cannot deteriorate, for 
example, the external balance either, having no immediate 
impact on it. Namely, individuals cannot use the 
contributions and the yields generated by them before 
they retire, not even as collateral for loans. In this sense, 
households’ consumption and savings expenditures are the 
same with or without the pension fund system.3 The 
demand effect indicator published by the MNB since 1998 
has been adjusted for this reason by the additional deficit 
caused by lost contributions. Another occasional paper 
published by the MNB (P. Kiss, 2011) proposes that one of 
the central bank indicators used for analysis purposes 
should not only be adjusted by changes in deficit across 
the years but also by deficit levels, which would be 
consistent with capturing the short-term effect. In order 
to separate the indicators capturing medium-term and 
short-term effects, the above study refers to the former as 
“augmented financing requirement”, and to the latter as 
“augmented deficit”. Meanwhile the mixed system has in 
effect been eliminated; therefore, the practical 
significance of this theoretical distinction has disappeared, 
as the difference between the two fiscal indicators is in 
the range of 0.1–0.2 per cent.
tHe iMPACt OF tHe PeNSiON SySteM 
ReFORM ON StAtiStiCS
On 13 December Parliament adopted Act CLIV of 2010 on 
the Pension Reform and Debt Reduction Fund and the 
modification of certain acts relating to the free choice of 
pension fund, which allows individuals to return to the state 
pillar of the pension system. Those returning to the state 
pension pillar acquired an entitlement to state pension, 
parallel to which the wealth they accumulated in private 
pension funds was transferred to the state.
It is necessary to deal with the transfer of wealth stemming 
from the pension system reform in the statistics. Currently 
we have no information on the savings remaining in pension 
funds. According to data provided by the Central 
Administration of National Pension Insurance, as of the 
expiration of the deadline at the end of January, around 
97,000 individuals had chosen to remain in the private 
pension fund system, which constitutes 3.1 per cent of 
members. Since those remaining in the private pension 
scheme presumably have larger average portfolios, the 
wealth for which private pension funds remain responsible 
may be greater than that proportional amount. Our 
indicators are based on the technical assumption that the 
assets remaining in private pension funds constitute around 
10 per cent of the total portfolio.
Statistics are also affected by the fact that those returning 
to the state pension system are entitled to withdraw the 
real yields of their payments, as well as any supplementary 
amounts paid by them or their employers (the estimated 
value of which is close to HUF 220 billion). Although it is a 
one-off item, the payment of real returns is handled 
differently than the transfers relating to the switch.
2 See: MNB (2011) and P. Kiss (2011) on the general government indicator. 
3   However, minor indirect effects cannot be ruled out on either side. Some individuals may have saved less as a result of the inheritability of the funds, 
while others may have prepared for their retirement years more consciously, having seen their wealth being accumulated in pension funds. MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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From the aspect of households, the processes can be 
captured by three different indicators, each with its own 
advantages and disadvantages.
1. Net lending recorded in the statistics of the financial 
accounts
The transformation of the private pension pillar brought 
about a restructuring between the household sector and 
the accounts of the general government. The restructuring 
will significantly improve the balance of the general 
government in the financial accounts, while there will be a 
corresponding decline in household savings.
The measures adopted in 2010 essentially eliminated the 
second (funded) pillar of the pension system; therefore, 
household data for 2011 − especially the financial accounts 
for the first quarter − are extremely difficult to interpret. 
As a result of the transformation of the pension system, the 
assets of those returning to the pay-as-you-go pillar will be 
transferred to the state, which will have a profound effect 
on the financial savings of households. The statistical 
accounting will be similar to that applied for the transfers 
at the end of 2009.4 The transfer of assets will be recorded 
statistically as a transaction; reducing both the financial 
savings and the net financing capacity of the sector in line 
with the size of the assets transferred, i.e. by approximately 
HUF 2,800 billion, corresponding to 10 per cent of GDP. As 
a result, the net financial savings of households will turn 
markedly negative in the first quarter of 2011 and, owing to 
temporarily re-channelled contributions − disregarding 
other factors − their level may remain well below the 
typical levels in quarters to come.5 This translates into a 
significant level shift in balance data, while transaction 
data,  ceteris paribus, will persistently reflect a minor 
growth in receivables.
The statistical balance of the general government will 
improve by private pension fund assets less real yields, 
corresponding in size to the adjustment of the household 
sector, only in the opposite direction.
2. Net lending capturing basic trends
In order to ensure comparability of data and capture 
economic developments better, in addition to examining 
the time series published in official statistics, the data 
appearing in the financial accounts should also be adjusted. 
The simplest way to perform this correction is to adjust the 
original data included in the financial accounts by the 
precisely quantifiable, one-off items related to private 
pension funds. In this approach, the transfer of assets and 
the portion of the real returns which increases savings are 
considered one-off factors.6
The advantage of this method is that it does not alter 
historical, factual data, and it distinguishes between the 
propensity for consuming out of current income and the 
capital revenue from accumulated real yields. At the same 
time, it has the disadvantage of not being consistent with 
the general government indicator that the MNB used for 
analysis purposes, namely the augmented (SNA) deficit. 
Indeed, in the latter indicator the official balance is 
adjusted by the reversible effects in such a manner that 
they are accounted for on the date when they actually 
triggered an economic effect. By contrast, based on 
historical factual data, it appears as though the rechanneled 
contribution was household income, but households were 
not able to use those funds − neither then, nor later. 
Therefore, another adjustment will be necessary to ensure 
that developments in the household sector are presented 
consistently with the augmented (SNA) deficit.
3. Net financing capacity consistent with the augmented 
(SNA) deficit
Based on the decision of Parliament last December, changes 
in the private pension fund pillar should be considered 
permanent. For the sake of the comparability of time series 
data, both as regards the general government and households, 
we have made corrections to the indicators used in this 
analysis retroactively to include the private fund transactions 
effected by those leaving the private pension pillar. This 
technique will yield a smoothed time series, which reveals 
how the balance of these two sectors would have evolved if 
those deciding to return to the state-run pension pillar had 
never been private pension fund members in the first place. 
The above adjustment corresponds to the assumption that 
the introduction of the funded pillars did not affect 
households’ consumption and savings decisions; in other 
words, the general government balance, ceteris paribus, is 
improved by the amounts involved in the transactions 
(revenues from contributions and owners’ revenues), while 
household savings suffered corresponding losses.
4   At the end of 2009 pension fund members of over 52 were allowed to return to the state system on a voluntary basis. In the financial accounts this 
reduced the net financing capacity of households by nearly HUF 30 billion in 2009 and by HUF 60 billion in 2010.
5   Loss of pension fund contributions will reduce the financing capacity of households at a rate of more than 1 per cent of GDP each year on a permanent 
basis.
6 We assume that half of the real returns received by households will be saved, while the other half will be used for consumption.MNB BulletiN • April 2011 47
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By contrast, the capital revenue from the accumulated 
real yields is expected to affect both households’ 
consumption and their savings decisions. Thus, as an 
expenditure, this will increase the augmented (SNA) 
deficit, since we also take it into account as revenue for 
households.
The indicators derived in this way have the advantage of 
ensuring that individual transactions are accounted for on 
the date when the actual economic effect took place. This 
approach ensures comparability between the past and 
future data included in the official financial accounts, and 
at the same time presents a more consistent picture of 
fiscal developments.
As Chart 1 clearly illustrates, returns from the private 
pension pillar generated large fluctuation in financial 
statistics. The indicator consistent with the augmented 
(SNA) deficit can capture, in terms of both level and 
dynamics, how the net financing capacity of households 
would have evolved if the pension reform had not taken 
place. By comparison, the indicator describing basic trends 
can reveal additional information only in the dynamics for 
2011, as, to a certain degree, it smoothes out the one-off 
effect of the disbursement of real yields.
It should be noted that changes to the pension system may 
also affect the seasonal adjustment of the household time 
series. Not only did the uncertainty of seasonal adjustment 
increase markedly due to the crisis, but it may also be 
affected by the corrections described above. Owing to 
returns to the state pillar at the end of 2009 and the 
suspension of private pension fund contributions in the 
fourth quarter of 2010, the seasonal adjustment of the 
official net financing capacity indicated in the financial 
accounts would show a distorted picture of the actual 
developments in savings. Consequently, among the time 
series presented, only the two corrected series should be 
seasonally adjusted and used for analysis purposes, as they 
are the only reliable indicators of the actual savings 
behaviour of the sector.
CONCluSiONS
The changes affecting private pension funds (transfers, 
suspension of payments) render the analysis of data 
pertaining to the household sector and the general 
government extremely difficult. Since historical data 
have not been adjusted in the official household statistics 
and the financial accounts, for analysis purposes it could 
be important to perform a retroactive correction. This 
article presents possible methods for performing this 
correction.
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
behaviour of households and the general government would 
have been different if the private pension scheme had not 
been introduced in the first place. While in the case of 
households this may have entailed only marginal effects 
which, in part, offset one another, fiscal policy may have 
evolved in a markedly different way. In this respect, our 
adjusted household and general government indicators may 
be interpreted as measures adequately capturing the 
Chart 1
Household savings consistent with the official and 
the augmented SNA indicator
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Chart 2
Net lending of households
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behaviour of households; however, as regards fiscal policy, 
they do not offer an answer as to how the deficit would 
have evolved without the pension reform.
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